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Three Ways to Link Merge with
Hierarchical Concept-Combination
Chris Thornton
In the Minimalist Program, language competence is seen to stem from
a fundamental ability to construct hierarchical structure, an operation
dubbed ‘Merge’. This raises the problem of how to view hierarchical
concept-combination. This is a conceptual operation which also builds hi-
erarchical structure. We can conceive of a garden that consists of a lawn
and a flower-bed, for example, or a salad consisting of lettuce, fennel and
rocket, or a crew consisting of a pilot and engineer. In such cases, concepts
are put together in a way that makes one the accommodating element with
respect to the others taken in combination. The accommodating element
becomes the root of a hierarchical unit. Since this unit is itself a concept,
the operation is inherently recursive. Does this mean the mind has two
independent systems of hierarchical construction? Or is some form of inte-
gration more likely? Following a detailed examination of the operations
involved, this paper shows there are three main ways in which Merge
might be linked to hierarchical concept-combination. Also examined are
the architectural implications that arise in each case.
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1. Introduction
Hauser et al. (2002) note that underlying language there must be a faculty that is
“hierarchical, generative, recursive, and virtually limitless with respect to its scope
of expression” (Hauser et al., 2002: 1569). By implication, the language systemmust
have, at its heart, an operator which can relate multiple objects to a single object in
the formation of a hierarchical unit. Recursive application of this operator must be
what gives rise to structurally complex expressions. The Minimalist Program dubs
this fundamental operator ‘Merge’. Chomsky deduces its existence as follows:
An elementary fact about the language faculty is that it is a system of
discrete infinity. Any such system is based on a primitive operation that
takes n objects already constructed, and constructs from them a new
object: in the simplest case, the set of these n objects. Call that opera-
tion Merge. Either Merge or some equivalent is a minimal requirement.
With Merge available, we instantly have an unbounded system of hier-
archically structured expressions. (Chomsky, 2005: 11-12)
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Chomsky also notes that Merge has the potential to be applied to conceptual
entities. Used this way, he observes, the operator would implement a composi-
tional medium of thought with an unlimited generative capacity. As he says,
Emergence of unbounded Merge at once provides a kind of language
of thought, an internal system that makes use of conceptual atoms (per-
haps pre-existent) to construct expressions of arbitrary richness and com-
plexity. (Chomsky, 2007a: 16)
No other internal compositional apparatus is needed, Chomsky maintains, to
explain the productivity of thought. While acknowledging it “is often argued that
another independent language of thought must be postulated”, he considers the
arguments not to be compelling (Chomsky, 2007a: 16).
The view is shared by, among others, Hauser (2009) and Hinzen (2009, 2012).
For Hinzen, Merge’s capacity to implement a language of thought is further ev-
idenced by the inherently grammatical nature of thought. Hinzen argues that a
“science of grammar is or can be a science of human thought because it uncovers
the principles and organization of thought, and it can do so because our mode of
thought is uniquely grammatical” (Hinzen, 2012: 642). This leads to the conclu-
sion that “insofar as our mode of thought is species-specific and needs to find an
explanation, grammar is the most likely such explanation” (Hinzen, 2012: 646). On
this view, generative grammar is not only the mediation of language, but also of
thought: It “is the essential mechanism we need, with no additional and indepen-
dent language of thought required” (Hinzen, 2012: 647).
Underlying this position is the assumption that grammar (or more fundamen-
tally Merge) is the only generative system of hierarchical construction the mind
possesses. Chomsky rejects the possibility of there being any hierarchically gener-
ative system other that Merge, commenting that “To date, I am not aware of any
real examples of unbounded Merge apart from language” (Chomsky, 2007b: 20).
Hinzen takes the same position in the case of grammar more generally, arguing
that
there is no known non-grammatical way in which meanings of that spe-
cific kind arise, or on what generative system they should be based.
(Hinzen, 2012: 646)
This raises the question of how to view hierarchical concept-combination.
This is a conceptual mechanism of the envisaged type. Concepts are readily put
into hierarchical combinations, and the process of doing so features prominently in
ordinary thought. In conceiving of a residence consisting of a house and garden,
or a bouquet consisting of a rose, orchid and tulip, or a meal consisting of a burger
and fries, we put concepts together in a way that makes one the accommodating
element with respect to the others taken in combination. A hierarchical structure is
produced in which the accommodating concept forms the root. Since what is ob-
tained is itself a concept, the procedure is inherently recursive. The garden that is
conceived as contributing to the make-up of a residence can, itself, be conceived as
consisting of a lawn and flower-bed. Concepts have the potential to be assembled
compositionally, and multi-level structures can be obtained in this way.
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Hierarchical concept-combination (HCC) makes use of conceptual entities to
construct compositional structures of arbitrary depth, then. This is akin to the ca-
pacity Chomsky attributes to Merge, for using conceptual atoms to construct “ex-
pressions of arbitrary richness and complexity” (Chomsky, 2007a: 16). Are Merge
and HCC the same operator, then? HCC implements a language of thought that
is inherently compositional. Chomsky notes that Merge does too. Are these two
languages of thought really the same language? Can we say that Merge = HCC?
The answer is not entirely straightforward. If Merge and HCC are the same
mechanism, each should be able to fulfil the functions of the other. In practice, the
relationship is not quite symmetrical. HCC distinguishes between an accommo-
dating concept, and concepts that are accommodated by it. Merge makes no such
distinction. While HCC can implement Merge, Merge can only implement HCC on
certain assumptions, then. Setting this reservation aside, the two mechanisms can
be seen as functionally equivalent, on which basis HCC might implement Merge,
or Merge might implement HCC. But this poses its own problems. If we assume
the two mechanisms are implemented separately—one in the language system and
one in the conceptual system—that would imply a wasteful duplication of mental
resources. If we assume there is only one implementation, there is the problem of
explaining how this could simultaneously serve the role of Merge in the production
of language, and of HCC in the production of hierarchical conceptualizations.
What is argued below is that there are two ways in which these two mecha-
nisms might be connected. The less radical scheme keeps the language system in its
usual form, but assumes that one of the two mechanisms provides services to the
other on a client-server basis. This raises the question of how the provision is ac-
complished: What changes are implied for the interface between the language and
conceptual systems? The more radical arrangement is one which keeps the concep-
tual system in its usual form, but assumes that HCC sends hierarchical structures
to the language system for translation into symbol sequences. This raises differ-
ent questions: How the translation is accomplished is clearly one. Counting the
arrangement in which the two operators work independently, there are then three
possible ways in which HCC and Merge might be related.
The remainder of the paper sets out the analysis in detail. There are five main
sections in all. The section immediately to follow (Section 2) looks at hierarchical
concept-combination from a more formal perspective. A shorthand is introduced
which allows constructions to be specified in the briefest possible way. This is then
used to develop a number of examples showcasing the compositional generativity
of the mechanism. Section 3 then looks at Merge and considers the ways it may be
related to HCC. The latter part of this section focuses specifically on the case where
HCC is considered to contribute hierarchical structures to the language system,
the ‘semantics-first’ arrangement as it is dubbed below. Section 4 then draws the
evidence together and considers what is implied. Finally, Section 5 offers some
concluding comments.
Some technical points should be mentioned at the outset. Material dealing
with conceptualization follows the approach of Murphy (2002) in avoiding use
of special fonts in the naming of concepts. Where there is any ambiguity, the
phrase ‘the concept of X’ is used to indicate that X is a concept name. Follow-
ing normal practice in linguistics, the dot ‘.’ is used as a connective in phrasal
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concept names. The concept of an old man thus has the name ‘old.man’. Some
of the material dealing with language makes use of interlinear glosses. All the
glosses presented can also be found in the online resource ‘The World Atlas of Lan-
guage Structures’ (Dryer and Haspelmath, 2011). References to the present con-
tents of this resource use the acronym ‘WALS’. The internet location of the resource
is http://wals.info.
2. Hierarchical Concept-Combination
The capacity that concepts have, to be put into hierarchical combinations, has not
been previously studied in any depth. This may be because the operation is such a
familiar and ubiquitous feature of thought. The opportunity to form a construction
of this type exists whenever one concept has the capacity to accommodate one or
more others, taken in combination. Examples are easily concocted; e.g., a family
that consists of a mother and child, or a salad consisting of lettuce, spinach and
cucumber, or a garden consisting of a lawn and a flower-bed. In each case, con-
cepts are brought together in a way that makes one the accommodating element
with respect to the others. The idea constructed is a hierarchical structure in which
the accommodating concept provides the root. Hierarchical concept-combination
is not to be confused with generic concept combination, however. This is a more
diverse process that has been modeled in a range of ways (e.g. Hampton, 1991;
Thagard, 1997; Rips, 1995; Wisniewski, 1997; Costello and Keane, 2001; Hampton,
1997, 2011).
Since an idea derived by hierarchical combination of concepts is itself a con-
cept, the operation is inherently recursive. We can conceive of a residence that
consists of a house and a garden, where the garden is conceived as consisting of a
lawn and flower-bed. Or we might conceive of a meal that consists of a steak and
salad, where the salad is envisaged as consisting of feta and fennel. In such cases,
a structure of two levels is obtained. In principle, new levels can be added without
limit. Hierarchical combination of concepts can give rise to multi-level structures
in this way.
A structure assembled in this way is not a concept hierarchy in any of the
usual senses, however. It is not, for example, a generalization hierarchy (a taxon-
omy or ‘is-a’ tree). In the concept of a family consisting of a mother and child, the
concept of a family does not generalize the concept of a mother. It does not play the
role of a hyponym. Neither is the structure a part-whole hierarchy (a meronomy
or ‘has-a’ tree). In a meronomy, each hierarchical entity is defined to be the com-
posite of the cited parts. There can be only one whole for any combination of parts,
whereas there can be multiple hierarchical accommodations for the same combi-
nation. A mother and child might be conceived as forming, say, a vocal duo, or a
darts team, as well as a family.1 Another standard form of concept hierarchy was
established by Gentner (1983). In her model, each hierarchical entity is a predicate
which defines a concept in terms of lower-level attributes and/or predicates. This
differs from the situation in hierarchical concept-combination, where each hierar-
1 An alternative way to make the distinction is to say that a part-whole hierarchy defines the
restricted case of hierarchical combination in which the accommodating concept is just the
concept of a composite (i.e., a set).
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chical entity specializes a concept: It is a realization of the concept constituted in a
specific way. Structures built by hierarchical concept-combination are not predicate
structures for this reason.
An interesting aspect of hierarchical concept-combination is its productivity.
Concepts can only be combined hierarchically in particular ways. We can conceive
of a family that consists of a mother and child. But the idea of a mother that consists
of a family and child makes no sense. These three concepts cannot be put together
in this way. Because of its meaning, the concept of a mother cannot accommodate
this combination. It cannot be the root of a hierarchical structure in which the ac-
commodated combination includes the concept of a family.
It is the semantic properties of concepts which define the hierarchical combi-
nations that can be formed, then. Accordingly, a given set of concepts gives rise
to a particular set of structures. This set has the potential to be empty. Imagine,
for example, we have just the concepts mother, child and father. There is no con-
cept within this set that can accommodate any combination of the others. The im-
plied set of hierarchical combinations is thus empty. But say we start with the set:
singer, guitarist, drummer, duo, band. Multiple hierarchical combinations are then
legitimized. One is the concept of a duo consisting of a guitarist and a singer (a
singer-guitarist duo). Another is the concept of a duo consisting of a guitarist and a
drummer (a drummer-guitarist duo). Since the concept of a duo can accommodate
any pair of individuals, and there are three such combinations, there are three duo
concepts that can be constructed.
Taking the semantic capacities of the band concept into account, the set of
structures expands further. Since a band can also consist of any combination of
music-making individuals, there is a band-based counterpart for each of the duo
concepts. But a band that consists of multiple duos can also be envisaged. There
are some two-level structures to be acknowledged in result. A band might combine
a singer-guitarist duo with a singer-drummer duo, for example. This is another
idea with a hierarchical structure of two levels. At one level, the duo concept is the
accommodating element; at the other, the band concept is.
Another interesting aspect of HCC is its unboundedness. Infinitely many con-
structions can potentially be derived. A hierarchical combination of existing con-
cepts constructs a concept that is inherently new: it is a compositional construc-
tion built from existing concepts, which differs from all of them. This new concept
may enable new hierarchical constructions to be assembled, giving rise to further
concepts and constructions in an ongoing way. Given a sufficient initial endow-
ment of concepts, HCC can, in this way, provide an infinitely productive language
of thought. The minimal requirement for infinite productivity is that every con-
struction provides a concept that facilitates at least one further construction. This
guarantees there will be infinitely many.
As noted above, HCC has not previously been studied as a conceptual mech-
anism in its own right. All work on concepts acknowledges this medium to some
degree, however. In general, concept construction is modeled as application of a
constructive operator to a set of existing concepts, e.g., taking the conjunction of the
concepts male and unmarried to define the concept of a bachelor (Murphy, 2002).
But this is closely related to hierarchical concept-combination. Any construction
which involves application of a constructive operator to certain operands can also
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be viewed as an act of hierarchical concept-combination. The accommodated com-
bination equates to the set of operands, while the accommodating concept equates
towhatever idea is realized by the construction, with the operands abstracted away.
Put another way, the accommodating concept is whatever concept is imposed on
the operands by the operator. For example, constructing a conjunction of concepts
can be seen as forming a hierarchical unit in which the concept of conjunction is
the accommodating element, and the conjoined concepts make up the accommo-
dated combination. What is obtained is an instance of the accommodating concept,
conceived as constituted in a particular way. The study of concepts takes the possi-
bilities of HCC into account to this extent (e.g. Laurence and Margolis, 1999; Carey,
2009).
2.1. HCC in Shorthand
To demonstrate the practical possibilities of hierarchical concept-combination, ex-
amples of some complexity will need to be set out. Since English descriptions of
complex structures quickly become unreadable, it is helpful to introduce a short-
hand at this point. The convention henceforth will be that a hierarchical structure
in which concept X is conceived as accommodating some combination of concepts,
will be denoted by enclosing all the concepts in square brackets with X placed first.
Thus
[X Y Z]
is shorthand for a hierarchical combination in which concept X is the accommodat-
ing element with respect to Y and Z. The accommodating concept—the hierarchical
root—is emboldened for emphasis. There can be any number of concepts in the ac-
commodated combination, and they are not in any order. Embedding of structure is
then dealt with by bracketing in the obvious way. The concept of an X encompass-
ing2 the combination of a Y and Z, where the Z itself encompasses the combination
of B, D and E, has the shorthand
[X Y [Z B D E]]
The examples introduced above can all be expressed more succinctly using this
approach. The concept of a family made up of a mother and child, for example, can
be expressed as
[familymother child]
The concept of a residence encompassing a house and garden, where the garden
itself encompasses a lawn and flower-bed can be expressed as
[residence house [garden lawn flower-bed]]
Any construction in the shorthand relies on knowledge of the cited concepts, and
how they are named in English. The basic knowledge of English that allows ‘a
family consisting of a mother and child’ to be correctly interpreted is also required
to interpret [family mother child]. The knowledge that ‘family’ names the concept
2 The terms ‘accommodating’ and ‘encompassing’ are used interchangeably in characterizing
the root element of a hierarchical unit.
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of a family, ‘child’ the concept of a child etc., is part of what gives a construction
its meaning. The only difference between an English specification of a hierarchical
concept-combination, and one expressed using the shorthand, is that in one case
accommodation is designated by the phrase ‘consisting of’, whereas in the other it
is designated by square-bracketing and constituent positioning.
If cited concept names are considered to be well-defined, then the shorthand
can legitimately be viewed as a formal notation for concept construction by hier-
archical combination. The assumption that these terms are well-defined might be
made on the grounds that the have definitions in English dictionaries. In princi-
ple, one might try to eliminate this appeal to knowledge of English by providing a
formal definition of the concepts in question. This is ruled out in practice, since a
general way of defining concepts has never been established (Carey, 2009).
Provided concept names are well-defined, expressions in the shorthand re-
main semantically precise regardless of their complexity. Since the only construc-
tion used is conceptual accommodation, it makes no difference how many times
this is applied. If a 1-level construction is semantically precise, so too is a n-level
construction, where n > 1. This can be illustrated using a three-level form. Con-
sider the idea of a meal consisting of a steak and a salad where the salad consists of
lettuce, cucumber and a dressing, and the dressing consists of oil, vinegar and salt.
This idea has a precisely defined meaning provided we possess the cited concepts,
and correctly interpret the indicated accommodations. The shorthand
[meal steak [salad lettuce cucumber [dressing oil vinegar salt]]]
is semantically precise on the same conditions.
The shorthand conforms to the following Backus-Naur (BNF) specification:
〈spec〉 ::= 〈concept-name〉
〈spec〉 ::= "[" 〈spec〉 〈spec〉+ "]"
The non-terminal 〈spec〉 denotes the specification of a concept. This is defined to
be either the name of a concept, or a square-bracketed sequence containing two or
more 〈spec〉. Use of the ‘+’ superscript allows that hierarchical combinations can
have any number of encompassed elements. Without this annotation, the effect
would be to enforce combinations with only one.3
Viewing the shorthand as a formal notation raises the question of how it
should be classified. What type of notation is this exactly? The convention of plac-
ing the accommodating concept first in sequence seems indicative of a prefix or
Polish notation—one in which the operator of a construction is placed before its
arguments. But this classification is incorrect strictly speaking. The operation im-
plied is hierarchical accommodation by means of the initially placed concept. It is
the initial concept deployed as the accommodating element. The initial concept is
not itself the constructive operator, and the shorthand is not a prefix notation for
this reason.
The shorthand is also not in any sense a version of predicate logic. This is
an important caveat, as predicate logic has often been used as a way of specifying
hierarchical concepts (e.g. Gentner, 1983). A hierarchical construction in predicate
3 Notice that since the encompassed elements in a construction have no order, it is always the
case that [X Y Z] = [X Z Y].
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logic does not describe a hierarchical concept-combination. The operation of logi-
cal predication is not the operation of conceptual accommodation. In one case, the
result is a truth value, in the other, it is the specialization of a concept. (This is one
reason for avoiding a predicate-style format in which the accommodated combina-
tion is enclosed in round brackets, and the accommodating concept is appended at
the front, e.g., X(Y,Z) used as shorthand for the concept of an X constituted of a Y
and Z. The other reason for avoiding this format is the desire to align bracketing
with concept realization. In the proposed approach, every bracketed entity realizes
a concept.)
The shorthand is neither a prefix notation, nor a version of predicate logic
then. More appropriate is to call it a programming language for concepts. The
shorthand has a kinship with LISP, a functional programming language often used
in AI (McCarthy et al., 1985/1962). LISP also uses prefix positioning to denote a
particular deployment of a named entity, on which basis we might view the short-
hand as a version of LISP in which function-calls evaluate to concepts. But, here
again, the correspondence is not perfect. Deployment of a computational function
is not the same thing as imposition of an encompassing concept. The treatment of
arguments also differs. In a programming language such as LISP, arguments are
given particular roles by positioning. This is not the case in the shorthand, where
the encompassed elements form an unordered combination.
We can now return to the main objective, which is to demonstrate the expres-
sive power of HCC by means of examples. An initial task is to show how varying
the size of the accommodated combination can affect the outcome. Imagine we are
providedwith a base of four concepts: the concept of a flight, the concept of a drive,
the concept of a journey and the concept of an excursion. The set of given concepts
is then: flight, drive, journey, excursion. Since a journey can be made-up of a flight
and a drive, a potential hierarchical combination is
[journey flight drive]
This places the concept of a journey into the accommodating role, with flight and
drive as the accommodated combination. It realizes the idea of a journey made up
of a flight and drive. Another possibility is
[excursion flight drive]
This expresses the subtly different concept of an excursion encompassing a flight
and a drive. While the same combination is accommodated, the accommodating
element differs, with the result that a different idea is obtained. What we obtain is
the idea of a particular type of excursion, rather than a particular type of journey.
Also of interest are hierarchical combinations incorporating a single accom-
modated concept; e.g.,
[journey drive]
This constructs the idea of a journey consisting solely of a drive. Another combina-
tion yields the idea of a journey solely consisting of a flight:
[journey flight]
Minimal constructions like these are termed ‘singular accommodations’ or just ‘sin-
gles’ below. Intuitively, they can be seen as classifications. The second, for example,
86 Chris Thornton
can be seen to express the idea of a flight that is also classified as a journey. But no-
tice there is no implication of either element being more general than the other.
Singles do not define hyponyms. The signified relationship is hierarchical accom-
modation which, in the case of a single accommodated element, implies ‘both’ (i.e.,
mutual accommodation).
Singles are also inherently reversible. An X that is classified as a Y can also be
seen as a Y classified as an X. Or, to put it another way, an X solely constituted of a
Y can also be seen as a Y solely constituted of an X. By definition, therefore
[X Y] = [Y X]
Important to the expressive power of HCC is the possibility to place relational con-
cepts in the encompassing role. With this done, the effect achieved is that of a
relational schema. An illustrative example is
[understanding teacher lawyer]
This constructs the concept of an understanding encompassing a teacher and a
lawyer (or an understanding between a teacher and a lawyer, as it would normally
be described). The accommodating concept is implicitly an imposed relation, and
what is constructed is a schema in result. But notice that no schema-making ap-
paratus is involved. The concept of understanding provides the key contribution.
Deployed in the accommodating role, it provides the ‘glue’ that holds the accom-
modated concepts together. The relational arrangement is captured purely by hier-
archical combination—by taking one concept to encompass the other two.
Singles can be used to refine concepts of this type. For example, the following
two-level structure might be specified:
[understanding [agent teacher] [recipient lawyer]]
This expresses the concept of an understanding encompassing a teacher and a
lawyer, in which the teacher is classified4 as agent, and the lawyer is classified
as recipient. It builds the concept of a teacher understanding a lawyer, rather than
the other way around. This begins to give a sense of how complex meanings of a
compositional type can be realized by HCC.
The process of adding levels to a structure can continue as long as suitable
concepts are available. We might, for example, write
[development [understanding [agent teacher] [recipient lawyer]]]
This adds a new level of meaning: The teacher’s understanding of the lawyer is
now classified as a development.
Use of singles, relational concepts and embedding increases the expressive
power of hierarchical concept-combination, then. With all these possibilities put to
use, the kinds of meaning we express using language are more easily obtained.5
Consider the following, for example:
[seeing.action [subject John] [object [definite.thing book]]]
4 Recall that singular accommodation implies mutual classification.
5 Having recognized the way concepts can be compositionally constructed by HCC, it is natural
to treat ‘meaning’, ‘concept’ and ‘idea’ as interchangeable terms.
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This constructs the idea of a seeing.action encompassing John classified as sub-
ject, and a book classified as object, in which the book is also classified as a def-
inite.thing. Taking into account the meaning of the subject and object concepts,
what is composed is the idea of some individual John6 seeing a definite book. It is
the idea of an action done by a particular individual to a particular thing. We could
express this in English by saying ‘John sees the book’.
A more elaborate example is
[yesterday.event
[giving.action
[subject [indefinite.thingman]]
[object bread]
[indirect.object John] ] ]
Key to the meaning of this four-level construction is the first accommodated con-
cept. Itself a structure, it expresses the idea of a giving action encompassing an
indefinite man (classified as subject), bread (classified as object) and John classified
as an indirect object. This yields the idea of an event in which an indefinite man
gives bread to John. The event is then itself classified as a ‘yesterday.event’, i.e., an
event occurring yesterday. The final product is the idea of a man giving bread to
John yesterday. This is somethingwe could express in English by saying ‘yesterday
a man gave bread to John’.
Some specialized forms of meaning, such as questions, can also be captured.
Consider this, for example:
[question
[[event drinking.action focal.thing]
[subject [definite.thing teacher]]
[object [definite.thing [substance water]] ] ] ]
The central construction here is
[event drinking.action focal.thing]
This expresses the idea of an event encompassing a drinking.action and a focal.thing.
Encompassed by this are water and a teacher, classified as subject and object respec-
tively (and also as definite objects). This idea is then itself classified as a question.
The final result is thus (the idea of) a question encompassing the idea of a defi-
nite teacher drinking some definite water. This is something we could express in
English by asking ‘Is the teacher drinking the water?’
These examples give a sense of the expressivity and productivity of hierarchi-
cal concept-combination. They reveal this to be language-like medium, in which
complex meanings can be constructed. As noted, the generativity of the medium
is unbounded in principle. If every construction that can be formed on some given
base legitimizes at least one further construction, there are infinitely many mean-
ings that can be derived. This is an important factor in the connection between
HCC and language. Both are mechanisms which allow infinitely many meanings
to be composed.
6 For present purposes, names of individuals are taken to name the concept of the individual in
question.
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3. Merge
The focus can now return toMerge, and the question of how this operator is related
to HCC. Informally, Chomsky characterizes the behavior of Merge as “Take two
objects, make another object” (Chomsky in Boeckx, 2009: 52). More precisely, the
operator “takes two syntactic objects α and β and forms the new object γ = {α, β}”
(Chomsky, 2001: 3). In building a hierarchical unit, Merge applies a particular con-
structive operation. The hierarchical unit constructed from α and β is defined to be
{α, β}. It is the set made up of the two constituents.
That HCC has the capacity to implement Merge can then be demonstrated.
The hierarchical construction that Merge obtains by
γ = {α, β}
can also be obtained by a hierarchical combination in which the concept of a set is
the accommodating element, and α and β form the accommodated combination.
The corresponding construction is
γ = [set α β]
In both cases, the hierarchical unit obtained specifies a set comprised of α and β.
HCC can also implement the operation known as ‘internal Merge’. This in-
volves re-merging the output of a construction with one of its constituents (e.g.,
in the case above, re-merging γ with α). What this produces is a two-level struc-
ture in which an element of the accommodated combination at the first level is also
within the accommodated combination at the second. From the conceptual point
of view, this is a perfectly legitimate state of affairs. Provided the constituents to
which Merge applies can be viewed as concepts, HCC can implement the operation
involved.
We can be confident that HCC has the capacity to implement Merge, then.
Whether Merge has the capacity to implement HCC is less clear. One problem is
the fact that HCC can by applied to combinations of any size, whereas the input to
Merge is a binary set. This is straightforwardly overcome, however. Merge has the
capacity to produce an input set of any size by hierarchically merging binary sets.
Merge can be applied to sets of any size in this way.7 The more serious obstacle is
the fact that Merge appears to disallow variation in the accommodating concept.
What is constructed in every case is a set.8 Is there any way of deploying Merge
that would allow variation in this?
The internal variant of the operation is potentially of use. As noted, internal
Merge is the special case in which a merged entity is re-merged with one of its con-
stituents. One constituent in particular is selected. In principle, this might be the
means of differentiating an accommodating concept. In favour of this scheme is
the way it connects the unbounded generativity of Merge to that of HCC. In the
latter case, the unboundedness results from the compositional nature of the oper-
ation: Concepts are put together in a hierarchical assembly. What is obtained is
inherently new (in the sense of being different to all the combined constituents), on
which basis further constructions can be obtained in an ongoing way.
7 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
8 A hierarchical structure formed by application of Merge is a meronomy in this sense.
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The unbounded generativity of Merge, on the other hand, is considered to
stem from the way internal Merge can be re-applied any number of times. There
is some debate as to whether this yields the right kind of generativity for lan-
guage. Hinzen (2009: 137) makes the point that Merge cannot bring about ‘cate-
gorial change’, while Boeckx (2009) argues that its output is not genuinely new. In
Boeckx’s view, “once you combine two units, X and Y, the output is not some new
element Z, but either X or Y.” A related concern is the fact that a hierarchical assem-
bly of object combinations can be reduced to (or expressed as) a non-hierarchical
combination. This raises the question of whether the structure is hierarchical in
the fullest sense. These concerns are not directly relevant, here, however. All that
matters is that internal Merge is potentially the means of achieving the discrimi-
nation required for HCC. This also has the attraction of explaining the operation’s
unbounded generativity in a new way.
Subject to certain qualifications, then, it can be concluded that HCC can im-
plement Merge, and Merge can implement HCC. The latter arrangement is prob-
lematic in one respect; but it is not unreasonable to assume the difficulty can be
overcome. Taking the functional equivalence of the two mechanisms to be estab-
lished, what should we then infer about the language system? Chomsky notes that
either Merge or “some equivalent” is the minimal requirement for production of
language (Chomsky, 2005: 11). Might HCC be the equivalent in question?
Assuming that it is induces a radically different conception of how language
is produced. The hierarchical structure produced by HCC is a semantic object rather
than a syntactic one. If this is the seed from which an utterance is derived, we have
to assume there is some apparatus capable of turning it into a linguistic form. There
has to be some mechanism which takes a semantic construct and derives from it
a sequential-symbolic representation (i.e., an utterance). On this understanding,
production of language would be accomplished on a ‘semantics-first’ basis, rather
than a ‘syntax-first’ one.
Is there any way of putting this semantics-first arrangement on an operational
footing? How could a hierarchical concept-combination with a certain meaning be
translated into a semantically equivalent symbol sequence? The obvious way to
accomplish this involves running semantic interpretation ‘backwards’. For the lan-
guage system to work there has to be knowledge of what symbols (i.e., words and
morphemes)mean. This lexical knowledge is normally assumed to be invoked only
at the stage of semantic interpretation. But the mapping can also be used to iden-
tify the symbol for a particular concept. The concept names used in a hierarchical
concept-combination are potentially translated to symbols in this way.
But how are the the symbols to be got into a syntactically correct order? Here,
the obvious solution is to make use of grammatical preferences. A sequential en-
coding of a concept structure, using symbols for the cited concepts, must distin-
guish the symbol that represents the accommodating concept. This has to be given
a particular position in the sequence, otherwise the original construction cannot
be inferred. Consider the typical case of a structure with two accommodated ele-
ments. This yields three symbols in all: one for the accommodating concept, and
two for the accommodated concepts. Put into a sequence, these three symbols en-
code the original structure provided the accommodating symbol can be identified.
This critical symbol has to be given a particular position in the sequence. It has to
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go first, last or in the middle. Given there are two ways of ordering the accommo-
dated symbols, this yields a total of 2× 3 = 6 orderings in all. Letting X, Y and Z be
the symbols in question, the six possible orderings are XYZ, XZY, YXZ, ZXY, YZX,
ZYX.
The way grammatical preferences might be exploited then begins to become
apparent. Languages typically have a preference to use a particular verb-phrase
structure, where the six options are VSO, VOS, SVO, OVS, SOV, OSV. If the verb
in a verbal construction is assumed to correspond to the accommodating element
of a hierarchical concept-combination, the six verbal structures are then identical
to the six symbol orderings for a typical concept structure. The ordering that the
language is known to prefer can potentially be applied. Might this be enough to
get symbols into the right order? Clearly, by itself, it would not. It fails to deal with
cases involving anything other than two accommodated concepts. But the general
idea of applying grammatical preferences can be put to use in different ways. This
approach can be the means of obtaining syntactically correct outputs in a number
of cases, as the examples of the next section illustrate.
4. Symbolic Encoding by Application of Grammatical Preferences
To illustrate the way grammatical preferences can be used to translate a seman-
tic form (a hierarchical concept-combination) into a linguistic form (a symbolic se-
quential encoding) with the same meaning, it is convenient to return to one of the
HCC examples used above:
[seeing.action [subject John] [object [definite.thing book]]]
Recall that this constructs the idea of John seeing a particular book, i.e., an idea
that can be expressed in English by ‘John sees the book’. How can the HCC be
translated into this expression? Grammatical preferences of English that apply in
this context include (1) a preference for SVO ordering, (2) a preference to identify
subject and object by ordering, and (3) a preference for head-initial organization in
simple phrases. These can be captured by means of the following three rules.
2 1 3
a
←− [= subject object]
2
b
←− [subject/object =]
1 2
c
←− [= =]
These rules are notated on a right-to-left basis, with labels placed over the arrows
for easy reference. Each rule shows the preferred ordering for a particular semantic
construction (i.e., HCC). The ordering appears to the left of the arrow, and the se-
mantic construction to the right. The first rule (labeled
a
←−) encodes the preference
for SVO organization; the second (labeled
b
←−) encodes the preference to encode
subject and object classifications by means of ordering, while the third (labeled
c
←−)
encodes the preference for head-initial organization in simple phrases.
The notation works in the following way. Rule
a
←− applies to any hierarchical
concept-combination which conforms to the shorthand:
[= subject object]
The structure can have anything as its accommodating element (the ‘=’ is a wild-
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card) but the accommodated combination must comprise subject and object con-
cepts. (Recall that, in the shorthand, accommodated concepts have no order.) A
subject concept is specified either by name (i.e., as ‘subject’) or as a construct for
which ‘subject’ is encompassing either explicitly or implicitly. This means [subject
John] is a subject concept, as is [definite.thing [subject John]].
The numbers on the left of a rule specify the way symbols should be ordered.
Each number indexes an element of the specification on the right, while its position
says where symbols arising for that element should be placed. Rule
a
←− has ‘2 1
3’ on the left. This means symbols arising for whatever matches the 2nd element
should be placed first, followed by symbols for whatever matches the 1st element,
followed by symbols for whatever matches the 3rd element. Given the structures it
can match to (and the assumption that verbs signify accommodating concepts) this
rule captures the preference for SVO ordering.
Rule
b
←− uses ‘/’ to denote alternatives. The specification matches any struc-
ture in which the first element is either a subject or object concept. The designation
on the left is just ‘2’, meaning only the encompassed element is symbolized. Given
the structures it can match to, this rule captures the preference for expressing sub-
ject and object classifications implicitly. The final rule deals with any single (i.e.,
any concept with a single accommodated element). It specifies that the symbol(s)
for the accommodating element should be placed before the symbol(s) for the ac-
commodated element. Given its coverage, this rule expresses the preference for
head-initial organization in simple phrases. Earlier rules take precedence, so
a
←−
has priority over
b
←−, which has priority over
c
←−.
With these rules defined, a syntactically valid expression of the HCC’s mean-
ing can then be derived, provided the concepts cited in the structure are symbolized
as follows.
book ← book
the ← definite.thing
John ← John
sees ← seeing.action
Each line here specifies the symbol to be used for a particular concept. The concept
is specified to the right of the ‘←’, and the symbol (word or morpheme) to the left.
The symbol specified for the concept of a book is defined to be book, for example.
Translation of the HCC, in accordance with the specified rules, then proceeds
as follows. At the start of the process, the object to be translated is the conceptual
structure itself. The only rule whose right-hand-side matches this object is
a
←−,
which is an organizational rule. Applying it has the effect of decomposing the ob-
ject into three constituents: the referents of the specified ordering. These objects
are then translated in the same way. Whenever an object to be translated matches
the right-hand-side of a lexical rule, it is immediately translated to the correspond-
ing symbol. Once all the constituents realized by applying an organizational rule
to an object have been translated, their encodings are put in the specified order,
and this sequence becomes the translation of the object itself. Eventually, the entire
conceptual structure is rendered into a sequential-symbolic form.
The processing can be shown schematically as follows.
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→ [seeing.action [subject John] [object [definite.thing book]]]
→ [subject John]
← John (John)
b
←− John
← sees (seeing.action)
→ [object [definite.thing book]]
→ [definite.thing book]
← the (definite.thing)
← book (book)
c
←− the book
b
←− the book
a
←− John sees the book
This listing uses indentation to visualize recursion. Each line represents application
of a rule. For each application of a lexical rule, there is a line which ends with the
relevant concept name. For example, translation of the concept name ‘book’ to the
symbol book is denoted by the line
← book (book)
For each application of an organizational rule, there is a line showing the concept
that is processed and—at with same indentation below—a second line showing the
symbol sequence assembled. Use of rule
b
←− to turn [definite.thing book] into the
book thus has an upper line of the form
→ [definite.thing book]
and a lower line of the form
b
←− the book
At completion of processing, the final translation obtained is John sees the book,
which is a syntactically valid way of expressing the meaning of the original con-
ceptual structure.
This example illustrates how a hierarchical conceptual structure can, by appli-
cation of grammatical preferences, be translated to a syntactically valid utterance
with the same meaning. It gives a sense of how HCC might fulfil the function
of the equivalent of Merge that Chomsky envisages. But notice the very differ-
ent conception of language production that arises. The process is not seen to be
shaped by knowledge of syntax. It is seen to stem from a capacity for hierarchical
concept-combination, coupled with an ability to apply grammatical preferences in
the derivation of symbolic encodings. Production of language is seen to be a kind
of assembly-line process, the first stage of which is construction of a semantic object
in the conceptual system, and the second stage of which is encoding of that object
into a sequential symbolic form.
More complex examples can also be assembled. All the HCC examples of
Section 2 can be put to use in this way. We can also vary the language in which the
output comes to be expressed. Consider again the utterance ‘John read the letter’.
Translated into Japanese, this becomes
Johnga tegamio yonda.
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For an assembly-line analysis of this sentence we require a hierarchical concept-
combination which expresses the correct meaning. As previously noted, a con-
struction with the meaning of ‘John read the book’ is
[[past.behavior reading.action] [subject John] [definite.thing letter]]
How can this be translated into syntactically valid Japanese? Grammatical prefer-
ences of Japanese in this context include (1) a preference for SOV ordering, and (2)
a preference for head-final organization in simple phrases. These can be captured
as follows:
2 3 1
a
←− [= subject definite.thing]
2 1
b
←− [= =]
Given the concepts it can match to, use of ‘2 3 1’ in rule
a
←− expresses the prefer-
ence for SOV organization, while rule
b
←− expresses the preference for head-final
organization in simple phrases. A syntactically valid expression is then obtained,
provided the cited concepts are symbolized as follows:9
John ← John
tegami ← letter
yon ← reading.action
da ← past.behavior
ga ← subject
o ← definite.thing
Translation of the conceptual structure then proceeds as follows:
→ [[past.behavior reading.action] [subject John] [definite.thing letter]]
→ [subject John]
← John (John)
← ga (subject)
b
←− John ga
→ [definite.thing letter]
← tegami (letter)
← o (definite.thing)
b
←− tegami o
→ [past.behavior reading.action]
← yon (reading.action)
← da (past.behavior)
b
←− yon da
a
←− John ga tegami o yon da
9 Lexical preferences are derived from the analysis of (Kuno, 1973: 10).
(i) John-ga tegami-o yon-da.
John-SUBJ letter-OBJ read-PST
‘John read the letter.’
See also WALS, Ch. 82, Ex. 2.
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With word-breaks imposed, the output is Johnga tegamio yonda, which is the desired
Japanese sentence.
Another example taken from Section 2 is
[yesterday.event
[giving.action
[subject [indefinite.thingman]]
[object bread]
[indirect.object John] ] ]
Recall that this builds the idea of an indefinite man giving bread to an individual,
John, at a particular point in time, namely yesterday. The meaning is one we could
express in English by saying ‘yesterday a man gave bread to John’. A sentence from
the Suriname language of Arawak with a not dissimilar meaning is
Miaka aba wadili sika khali damyn.
This means ‘yesterday a man gave cassava bread to me’. To capture this meaning,
the conceptual structure above needs to be modified in two ways. The recipient of
the action needs to be specified as ‘me’ rather than ‘John’, and the object needs to
be ‘cassava.bread’ rather than ‘bread’. This produces
[yesterday.event
[giving.action
[subject [indefinite.thingman]]
[object cassava.bread]
[indirect.objectme] ] ]
How can this structure be translated into Arawak? Grammatical preferences of
this language in this context include (1) a preference for SVO organization; (2) a
preference for dealing with subject and object by ordering; (3) a preference for head-
final organization in simple phrases denoting an indirect object; and (4) a preference
for head-final organization elsewhere. These can be captured by the following four
rules.
2 1 3 4
a
←− [= subject object indirect.object]
2
b
←− [subject/object =]
2 1
c
←− [indirect.object =]
1 2
d
←− [= =]
With these rules defined, a syntactically valid Arawak expression is obtained pro-
vided cited concepts are symbolized as follows:10
10 All preferences derived from the analysis of (Pet, 1987).
(i) Miaka aba wadili sika khali da-myn.
yesterday INDEF man give cassava.bread 1SG-to
‘Yesterday a man gave cassava.bread to me.’
See also WALS, Ch. 84, Ex. 4.
Merge v. HCC 95
khali ← cassava.bread
sika ← giving.action
aba ← indefinite.thing
myn ← indirect.object
wadili ←man
da ←me
miaka ← yesterday.event
Mapping of the conceptual structure then proceeds as follows. (Notice some lines
are truncated.)
→ [yesterday.event [giving.action [subject [indefinite.thingman]] ...
← miaka (yesterday.event)
→ [giving.action [subject [indefinite.thingman]] [object ...
→ [subject [indefinite.thingman]]
→ [indefinite.thingman]
← aba (indefinite.thing)
← wadili (man)
d
←− aba wadili
b
←− aba wadili
← sika (giving.action)
→ [object cassava.bread]
← khali (cassava.bread)
b
←− khali
→ [indirect.object me]
← da (me)
← myn (indirect.object)
c
←− da myn
a
←− aba wadili sika khali da myn
d
←− miaka aba wadili sika khali da myn
With word-breaks imposed, the output is Miaka aba wadili sika khali damyn,
which is the desired Arawak sentence.
This example can also be used to give a sense of how the approach might
explain movement—the “curious but ubiquitous phenomenon of displacement in
natural language” as Chomsky describes it (Chomsky, 2009a: 31). In the statement
‘yesterday a man gave cassava bread to me’, the initial word can be moved to final
position without affecting the meaning. The statement then becomes ‘a man gave
cassava bread to me yesterday’. If we assume that in an English version of the
above, two organizational rules are invoked by the structure [yesterday.event ...],
one having ‘1 2’ as its ordering, and the other having ‘2 1’, the selection between
them is potentially made at random. On this basis, the optionality of the two forms
can be explained by saying either way of formulating the sentence is potentially
derived.
To complete this series of examples, we should also look at
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[question
[[drinking.action focal.thing]
[subject [definite.thing teacher]]
[object [definite.thing [substance water]] ] ] ]
Recall that this builds an idea that would be expressed in English by asking the
question ‘Is the teacher drinking the water?’ Say we would like to develop an
analysis of this question expressed in German. The question then takes the form
Trinkt der lehrer das wasser?
How can this German question be derived from the conceptual structure? Gram-
matical preferences of German in this context include (1) a preference to encode
subject and object classifications by ordering alone; (2) the preference for VSO or-
ganization given a meaning classified as a question; (3) the preference for SVO or-
ganization otherwise, and (4) the preference for head-initial organization in simple
phrases. These can be encoded by the following four rules.
2
a
←− [subject/object =]
2 3 4
b
←− [question [= subject object]]
2 1 3
c
←− [= subject object]
1 2
e
←− [= =]
With these definitions given, a syntactically valid, German expression of the con-
struct’s meaning is obtained provided cited concepts are symbolized as follows:11
lehrer ← teacher
wasser ← water
trink ← drinking.action
das ← [definite.thing substance]
der ← definite.thing
t ← focal.thing
Notice the use of a structured specification in the case of das. This is required to
capture the restricted range of this determiner.
Mapping of the conceptual structure then proceeds as follows:
→ [question [[drinking.action focal.thing] [subject ...
→ [drinking.action focal.thing]
← trink (drinking.action)
← t (focal.thing)
e
←− trink t
→ [subject [definite.thing teacher]]
→ [definite.thing teacher]
11 Lexical preferences are derived from the analysis of (Dryer and Haspelmath, 2011, Ch. 116,
Ex. 6).
(i) Trink-t der Lehrer das Wasser?
drink-3SG DEF teacher DEF water
‘Is the teacher drinking the water?’
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← der (definite.thing)
← lehrer (teacher)
e
←− der lehrer
a
←− der lehrer
→ [object [definite.thing [substance water]]]
← das ([definite.thing substance])
← wasser (water)
a
←− das wasser
b
←− trink t der lehrer das wasser
Once standard word-breaks and capitalization have been imposed, the output is
found to be the desired German question: Trinkt der Lehrer das Wasser?
If we remove the question classification in the original conceptual form, only
the inner structure remains:
[[drinking.action focal.thing]
[subject [definite.thing teacher]]
[object [definite.thing [substance water]] ] ]
This realizes a meaning we might express in English by the statement ‘the teacher
is drinking the water.’ Applying the rules to this reduced structure then invokes
the default SVO ordering, with the effect of placing the verb between rather than
before subject and object. The processing is as follows:
→ [[drinking.action focal.thing] [subject ...
→ [subject [definite.thing teacher]]
→ [definite.thing teacher]
← der (definite.thing)
← lehrer (teacher)
e
←− der lehrer
a
←− der lehrer
→ [drinking.action focal.thing]
← trink (drinking.action)
← t (focal.thing)
e
←− trink t
→ [object [definite.thing [substance water]]]
← das ([definite.thing substance])
← wasser (water)
a
←− das wasser
c
←− der lehrer trink t das wasser
With word-breaks and capitalization imposed, the output is then der Lehrer trinkt
das Wasser, which expresses the assertion ‘the teacher is drinking the water’.
The examples of this section demonstrate that, at least in certain cases, syn-
tactically valid outputs can be obtained by mapping conceptual structures to sym-
bol sequences in accordance with grammatical preferences. Is there any reason to
believe this might be possible more generally? Can the assembly-line model be
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applied in more than just this handful of cases? There is a case for thinking the ap-
proach may be no less general than conventional syntactic analysis. The argument
is based on the idea that any syntactical analysis can be converted into an assembly-
line analysis. This is done by decomposing the syntactic analysis into two parts, one
dealing with hierarchical structure, and the other dealing with sequential structure,
where the former is an HCC, and the latter are the rules defining grammatical pref-
erences and symbolization. The decomposition separates the specifically hierarchi-
cal aspect of the syntactic analysis from the specifically sequential specification.
The decompositional process can be illustrated using ‘John sees the book’
again. This utterance takes the form of a verb phrase in which ‘sees’ is the verb,
‘John’ is the subject, and ‘the book’ is the object. The structure can be analyzed as
follows:
(V P sees(N John) (NP (DET the)(N book)))
To decompose this analysis into two parts, we proceed as follows. First, we
replace each grammatical constituent with a semantically equivalent conceptual
constituent. In the simplest case, the constituent is a content word, and the re-
placement is just the corresponding concept name. The two content words here are
‘John’ and ‘book’, but both can be seen as concept names in their own right, so no
change is needed. The second step involves replacing each grammatical construc-
tion with a semantically equivalent conceptual construction. This is a hierarchical
concept-combination in which the encompassing concept has the meaning that the
grammatical construction imposes on its subordinate elements. Or, to put it another
way, the encompassing concept is whatever idea is realized by the construction,
once the constituents are abstracted away.
In this case there are two such constructions: the verb phrase and the noun
phrase. In the latter, the word ‘the’ is an article (an ART.DEF). As this is the definite
article, a particular meaning is implied—that what is referred to is a definite as
opposed to indefinite book. The effect is to impose the meaning of the book being
a definite thing. The construct is thus replaced with an HCC which imposes the
relevant classification:
[definite.thing book]
This has the effect of classifying12 the book as a definite.thing.
The verb ‘sees’ imposes the meaning (in the same sense as above) of a see-
ing action on the subordinate subject and object. This is thus replaced with the
construction
[seeing.action John [definite.thing book]]
This expresses the idea of a seeing action encompassing John and a definite book.
Still needed is discrimination of subject and object. This is where the grammatical
structure captures meaning by the ordering of branches. The SVO ordering of the
verb phrase has the effect of classifying ‘John’ as subject, and ‘the book’ as object.
Branches in the conceptual structure are unordered, so for the conversion, we need
to add the relevant classifications. The structure then becomes
12 Recall that mutual accommodation implies mutual classification.
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[seeing.action [subject John] [object [definite.thing book]]]
This is the structure that we already know expresses the meaning of ‘John sees the
book’. The semantic part of the assembly-line analysis can be derived from the
syntactic analysis in this way. The other part of the analysis then comprises the
grammatical preferences, both lexical and organizational, that produce the sequen-
tial symbolization.
The semantics-first approach, which results from assuming HCC fulfils the
function of what Chomsky calls ‘some equivalent’ of Merge, may have a reason-
able degree of generality, then. If a conventional syntactic analysis can be trans-
lated into a semantics-first account, the two approaches have the same explana-
tory range. What seems most problematic about the semantics-first model is that
it eliminates the role normally attributed to syntactic knowledge. But the idea that
languages have syntactic structure is retained. The assumption is that this can be
seen as the confluence of two shaping influences, one being HCC, and the other
being the grammatical preferences of the language in question. On this basis, the
assembly-line model is closer to the norm than it may seem. Fully acknowledged is
the fact that languages have structure, and that taxonomizing this structure reveals
syntax. What is added is the observation that this structure may be the result of an
interaction between two forces.
5. Discussion
Taking all the evidence into account, what can be concluded? Some aspects of the
situation are certainly beyond dispute. At the heart of the language system there
has to be a mechanism of hierarchical construction which assembles expressions
of arbitrary richness and complexity. As Chomsky notes, “Either Merge or some
equivalent is a minimal requirement.” (Chomsky, 2005: 11-12) The capacity to com-
bine concepts hierarchically is also central to the conceptual system. A mechanism
of hierarchical concept-combination has to exist.13 Both Merge and HCC must,
then, be implemented in the mind.
What is at issue is their relationship. Hauser et al. characterize the function-
ality of Merge as “hierarchical, generative, recursive, and virtually limitless with
respect to its scope of expression” (cf. Hauser et al., 2002: 1569). Precisely the same
description can be given to HCC. An equivalence between the two mechanisms is
suggested and, on close inspection, this is found to be nearly perfect. HCC can
reproduce Merge, and subject to certain assumptions, Merge can do the same for
HCC. In consequence, HCCmight be the equivalent of Merge that Chomsky envis-
ages. Assuming this to be so results in the semantics-first interpretation of language
production, as described above.
If we set the semantics-first model aside, two possibilities then remain. One is
that Merge and HCC are completely disconnected. This is a viable option. Merge
can be seen to play its usual role in the language system, while HCC operates sep-
arately in the conceptual system. This conforms to the idea of the two systems
13 It is not claimed here that this is the only way conceptual structure can be built. Reinhart’s
observation that ordering of constituents generally plays no role in conceptual structure (Rein-
hart, 1976) is consistent with HCC being the constructive mechanism implied, however.
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being functionally independent. But it does entail assuming significant duplication
of cognitive resources. We have to assume the mind possesses two functionally
equivalent ways of constructing meanings compositionally. There must be two dis-
tinct generative mechanisms, and they must be resourced independently.
The other possibility is that one of the two mechanisms provides constructive
services to the other on a client-server basis. The advantage of this is that it avoids
assuming duplication of resources, while retaining the standard conception of lan-
guage being produced on a modular ‘syntax-first’ basis. Challenging questions do
arise, however. For this arrangement to work, the interface between the language
and conceptual systems must have the capacity to mediate the provision of con-
structive services. How is this accomplished? Whichever operator is the ‘server’,
we have to assume it can be manipulated in a way that allows both constructions
of syntax, and constructions of HCC to be obtained. How this dual functionality is
operationalized becomes a critical issue.
      Sequential-
    symbolization  
THOUGHT/
MEANING
SOUND/
GESTURE
(C-I) (S-M)
THOUGHT/
MEANING
SOUND/
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 (Syntax)
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Figure 1: Alternative conceptions of the Merge-HCC relation: (A) syntax-first processing in
the standard Minimalist architecture; (B) semantics-first processing.
If we rule out the idea of Merge and HCC being completely disconnected on
the grounds that this entails too great a duplication of mental resources, what re-
mains is either the syntax-first arrangement, or the previously described semantics-
first arrangement. These are illustrated schematically in Figure 1. Panel (A) repre-
sents the syntax-first case. This is essentially the standard Minimalist architecture,
with Merge as the central element. There is one interface which conveys construc-
tions to the conceptual system (C-I), and anotherwhich externalizes themvia sound
and gesture (S-M). The only modification is the assumption that Merge provides
constructive services to HCC, or vice versa, and that the Merge/C-I interface me-
diates this.
Panel (B) illustrates the semantics-first alternative. Here, the hierarchical struc-
ture underlying an utterance is seen to be constructed in the conceptual system, by
hierarchical concept-combination. The flow of information is left-to-right. The con-
ceptual system (C-I) is assumed to send hierarchical structures to an intervening
symbolization module, which then uses grammatical preferences to derive syntac-
tically well-formed outputs. These are then sent for externalization via S-M in the
usual way.
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Like the syntax-first model, the semantics-first model has a mix of pros and
cons, some of which have already been discussed. The key advantage is that it
avoids the need for linguistic Merge. HCC is taken to be the Merge-equivalent that
Chomsky envisages. This makes compositional thought the generative system be-
hind language, a strategy which Hinzen notes would be appealingly parsimonious
(Hinzen, 2012: 637). Another positive feature of the interpretation, not previously
mentioned, is its ability to reconcile views on language and thought. It has been
seen that HCC is a medium in which compositional meanings can be constructed,
and that, like Merge, it is limitless in its scope of expression. Some theorists have
doubted whether there is any medium other than language which is compositional
in this way (e.g. Chomsky, 2007b; Hinzen, 2012). The existence of HCC shows
there is, and this has implications for the debate about how language and thought
are related.
The debate has particularly focused on the issue of whether thought or lan-
guage is prior. With the structural forms of language assumed to be defined by
grammar (syntax), the key question has been whether it is thought which shapes
grammar, or grammar which shapes thought. Theorists inclined towards the for-
mer arrangement include (Bates and MacWhinney, 1979, 1987; Bickerton, 1990;
Fodor, 2001; Elman, 2004; Kirby, 1999; Jackendoff, 2002; Tomasello, 2003; Clair et
al., 2009; Chater and Christiansen, 2010; Tomasello, 2008). Theorists inclined to the
view that it is grammar which shapes thought include (Fitch and Chomsky, 2005;
Chomsky, 2012, 2009b; Hauser, 2009; Hinzen, 2009).
The existence of HCC raises the possibility of an intermediate position. It
allows that thought might shape grammar at the same time as grammar shapes
thought. Under the semantics-first arrangement, the hierarchical forms of HCC
are seen as shaping the hierarchical structure of utterances, while their sequential-
symbolic form is seen to be shaped in another way—by grammatical preferences.
On this view, thought shapes the hierarchical forms of language only. The idea of
thought shaping language in this partial sense does have some support in the litera-
ture. Jackendoff, for example, observes that meaning would “be the first generative
component of language to emerge” (Jackendoff, 2003: 664), due to being a “combi-
natorial system independent of, and far richer than, syntactic structure” (Jackend-
off, 2002: 123). It also conforms to Hauser’s view of language as a “mind-internal
computational system designed for thought and often externalized in communica-
tion” (Hauser, 2009: 74).
But the claim that grammar shapes thought is then also validated to some de-
gree. Grammar is seen to be a formulation in which hierarchical constructions of
thought obtain a sequential form. On this basis, the position that “thought itself
is fundamentally linguistic” (Corballis, 2014: xiii) is not invalid. Nor is Hinzen’s
observation that in use of language “we see new forms of meaning arising in ways
that exactly reflect a narrow range of grammatical operations and options” (Hinzen,
2012: 646). On the semantics-first model, the structures which convey these mean-
ings are seen to be modulated by the ways in which ordering is imposed. But
this still allows that, in some sense, “the generative system of language underlies
and is actually indistinguishable from the generative system that powers abstract
thought” (Hinzen, 2009: 125). Grammar is seen to express the compositional struc-
tures of thought, accommodating Chomsky’s observation that “language evolved,
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and is designed primarily as an instrument of thought” (Chomsky, 2009a: 29).
In other respects, the semantics-first model is less attractive. There is no im-
plementational question, since HCC can fully perform the function of Merge. But
the model changes the conception of how language is produced in a radical and
potentially unacceptable way. The indications are that syntactically well-formed
utterances can be produced bymapping hierarchical concept-combinations to sym-
bol sequences in accordance with context-specific grammatical preferences. This
explains how an inherently unordered object—an HCC—can give rise to an inher-
ently ordered one—a sequence of symbols. But it also has the effect of eliminating
conventional syntax from the account. Explicit syntactic rules are seen to play no
role.
This might be seen as advantageous. The requirement to explain how the lan-
guage system adheres to, and applies rules of syntax is dissolved, as is the require-
ment to discover what the rules are. Instead, there is a requirement to explain how
grammatical preferences can turn conceptual structures into symbol sequences. As-
suming, fewer rules are required for this, the effect is to simplify the account. This
is one way the model might be seen as more parsimonious. There are others. Se-
mantic and syntactic processing are normally seen as separate. The language sys-
tem is assumed to perform syntactic processing independently. Hinzen calls this
“the spirit of the autonomy of syntax” (Hinzen, 2012: 638). Consequently, there is
a need to explain how semantic processing comes to influence language produc-
tion, an objective that has been called the “final frontier” of linguistics (Fitch, 2009:
306). Under the semantics-first model, this requirement is eliminated. Semantic
processing is now the first stage in an assembly-line process from which syntacti-
cally correct utterances emerge. This makes semantics an integral part of syntax. At
the same time, it makes the grammatical preferences which shape the second stage
functionally critical. This might also be seen as beneficial, however, as it answers
a puzzling question. Grammatical preferences (e.g. for head-initial organization)
have often been seen as problematic from the explanatory point of view (Polinsky,
2012).
The semantics-first model is not without explanatory benefits, then. The prob-
lem is that most of them can also be seen as costs. The model can be seen as failing
to respect the autonomy of syntax, and as ignoring the distinction between syntax
and semantics. By making semantics an integral part of syntax, it effectively elim-
inates the traditional idea of a syntax/semantics interface. The model can also be
seen as blurring the distinction between syntax and morphology, and as negating
the principle that grammatical preferences are functionally neutral. It can only be
adopted, it seems, at the price of flying in the face of established theory.
There is no clear winner between the syntax-first and semantics-first interpre-
tations, then. Both present a mix of advantages and disadvantages. Can we escape
the impasse by assuming the existence of a more primitive operator, from which
both Merge and HCC are descended?14 Might it be that Merge and HCC have a
common ancestor, without being directly related? It is difficult to see how there
could be an ancestor of HCC, even in principle. Any ancestor from which HCC is
derived must subserve the capacity to combine concepts in a way that makes one
the accommodating element with respect to the others. But in that case, the an-
14 My thanks to two anonymous reviewers for suggesting this possibility.
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cestor is HCC itself. There seems to be no way to reduce this operation to a more
primitive form. Merge can perhaps, be seen as a descendent of HCC, since the op-
eration it performs is a special case of HCC. But the existence of a common ancestor
seems to be ruled out.
6. Concluding Comments
The Minimalist approach sees Merge as the generative mechanism behind lan-
guage. But it also acknowledges that any unbounded system of hierarchical con-
struction might suffice. Hierarchical concept-combination, it seems, fits the bill so
could be all that is needed. But this turns the language system on its head. The
generative mechanism behind language is now in the conceptual system and, more
awkwardly still, is a generator of semantic rather than syntactic structure. It is a
medium for assembling arbitrarily complex meanings by compositional thought.
The only way to accommodate this is to change the central role of the language
system altogether. No longer can this be the building and interpreting of syntactic
structure. Instead, it has to be sequential-symbolic encoding/decoding of hierar-
chical structure native to the conceptual system.
This, the semantics-first or assembly-line model, is one way in which Merge
and HCC might be related. Arguably, the most interesting option, it is also the
one which produces most epistemic upheaval. The other two possibilities conform
more to established theory. The first is that Merge and HCC are completely dis-
connected. The second is that one of these mechanisms uses the other on a client-
server basis. The latter raises thorny questions about implementation, while the
former entails assuming an inherently implausible duplication of resources. On
the present evidence, then, it is hard to establish which of the three arrangements
is closest to the truth.
Empirical investigation could certainly pay dividends in this situation. The
semantics-first model gives rise to specific predictions. Syntactically correct utter-
ances are seen to stem from the way HCC interacts with sequential symbolization.
Knowledge of syntax plays no role. But if knowledge of sequencing conventions,
combined with a capacity for HCC, suffices to produce utterances conforming to
syntactic rules, linguistic performance should run well ahead of syntactic evidence.
Language learners should be seen to produce utterances that conform to syntactic
rules without ever encountering any examples of the rules in question. Experimen-
tation probing this capacity is one way of empirically testing the semantics-first
model, then. (According to some theorists, evidence of this capacity already ex-
ists in the form of poverty-of-stimulus effects. The claim remains controversial, but
should it ultimately be validated, this would favour the semantics-first model.)
Another prediction of the semantics-first model stems from its commitment
to the idea of assembly-line processing. If language production involves two dis-
tinct stages of processing, the first semantic, the second non-semantic, this should
be reflected in the neurological evidence. Under the standard model of language
production, syntax is seen as relatively autonomous. This entails that semantic
processing should follow or co-occur with non-semantic processing. Under the
semantics-first model, it is the other way around. Semantic processing must be
complete before non-semantic processing can even begin. The processing in the
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brain that mediates production of an utterance should exhibit two stages, then: the
first inherently semantic, the second inherently non-semantic. If evidence of this
division already exists, or can be obtained, that would favour the semantics-first
interpretation. Resolution of the question of how Merge and HCC are related in
the mind is likely to come from empirical investigation, then. Assessment of evi-
dence that already exists may also be able to shed some light. It is hoped that future
work will make progress in these ways.
References
Bates, Elizabeth & Brian MacWhinney. 1979. A functionalist approach to the ac-
quisition of grammar. In Elinor Ochs & Bambi Schieffelin (eds.), Developmental
Pragmatics, 167–209. Academic Press.
Bates, Elizabeth & Brian MacWhinney. 1987. Competition, variation, and language
learning. In Brian MacWhinney (ed.), Mechanisms of Language Acquisition, 157–
93. Erlbaum.
Bickerton, Derek. 1990. Language and Species, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Boeckx, Cedric. 2009. The nature of merge: Consequences for language, mind,
and biology. In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Juan Uriagereka & Pello Salaburu
(eds.), Of Minds and Language: A dialogue with Noam Chomsky in the Basque Coun-
try, 44–57. Oxford University Press.
Carey, Susan. 2009. The Origin of Concepts, Oxford University Press.
Chater, Nick & Morten H. Christiansen. 2010. Language acquisition meets lan-
guage evolution. Cognitive Science 34(7). 1131–1157.
Chomsky, Noam. 2001. Derivation by phase. Ken Hale: A Life in Language, The MIT
Press. 1–52.
Chomsky, Noam. 2005. Three factors in language design. Linguistic Inquiry, 36.
1–22.
Chomsky, Noam. 2007a. Biolinguistic explorations: Design, development, evolu-
tion. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15. 1–16.
Chomsky, Noam. 2007b. Of minds and language. Biolinguistics 1. 9–27.
Chomsky, Noam. 2009a. Opening remarks. In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Juan
Uriagereka & Pello Salaburu (eds.), Of Minds and Language: A dialogue with Noam
Chomsky in the Basque Country , 13–43. Oxford University Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 2009b. Concluding remarks. InMassimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Juan
Uriagereka & Pello Salaburu (eds.), Of Minds and Language: A dialogue with Noam
Chomsky in the Basque Country, 379–409. Oxford University Press.
Chomsky, Noam. 2012. The Science of Language: Interviews with James McGilvray,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Corballis, Michael C. 2014. The Recursive Mind: The Origins of Human Language,
Thought, and Civilization, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Costello, Fintan J. & Mark T. Keane. 2001. Testing two theories of conceptual com-
bination: Alignment versus diagnosticity in the comprehension and production
of combined concepts. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and
Cognition 27(1). 255–271.
Merge v. HCC 105
Dryer, Matthew S. & Martin Haspelmath. 2011. The World Atlas of Language Struc-
tures Online, Munich: Max Planck Digital Library. Package online at http://wals.info/
Accessed on 2013-04-06.
Elman, Jeffrey L. 2004. An alternative view of themental lexicon. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences 8. 201–206.
Fitch, Tecumseh W. & Chomsky, Noam. 2005. The evolution of the language fac-
ulty: Clarifications and implications. Cognition 97(2). 179–210.
Fitch, Tecumseh W. 2009. Prolegomena to a future science of biolinguistics. Biolin-
guistics 3(4). 283-320.
Fodor, Jerry A. 2001. Language, thought, and compositionality. Mind & Language
16(1). 1–15.
Gentner, Dedre. 1983. Structure-Mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy.
Cognitive Science 7. 155-170.
Hampton, James A. 1991. The combination of prototype concepts. In Paula J.
Schwanenflugel (Ed.), The Psychology of Word Meanings, Hillsdale, N.J: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Hampton, James A. 1997. Conceptual combination: Conjunction and negation of
natural concepts. Memory and Cognition 25. 888–909.
Hampton, J. 2011. Conceptual combination and fuzzy logic. In Radim Be˘lohlavek
& George J. Klir (eds.), Concepts and Fuzzy Logic, 209–232. MIT Press.
Hauser, Marc D., Noam Chomsky & Tecumseh W. Fitch. 2002. The faculty of lan-
guage: what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science 198. 1569-1579.
Hauser, Marc D. 2009. Evolingo: The nature of the language faculty. In Massimo
Piattelli-Palmarini, Juan Uriagereka & Pello Salaburu (eds.), Of Minds and Lan-
guage: A dialogue with Noam Chomsky in the Basque Country. 74–84, Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Hinzen,Wolfram. 2009. Hierarchy, Merge, and truth. InMassimo Piattelli-Palmarini,
Juan Uriagereka & Pello Salaburu (eds.), Of Minds and Language: A dialogue with
Noam Chomsky in the Basque Country, 124–141. Oxford University Press.
Hinzen, Wolfram. 2012. The philosophical significance of Universal Grammar. Lan-
guage Sciences 34. 635-649.
Jackendoff, Ray. 2002. Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution,
Oxford University Press.
Jackendoff, Ray. 2003. Pre´cis to Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Gram-
mar, Evolution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26(6). 651–65.
Kirby, Simon. 1999. Function, Selection and Innateness: The Emergence of Language
Universals, Oxford University Press.
Kuno, Susumu. 1973. The Structure of the Japanese Language, Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press.
Laurence, Stephen & Margolis, Eric. 1999. Concepts and cognitive science. In Eric
Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings, 3–82. London,
England: MIT press.
McCarthy, John, Paul W. Abrahams, Daniel J. Edwards, Timothy P. Hart & Michael
I. Levin. (1985/1962). LISP 1.5 Programmer’s Manual (2nd ed.), Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press.
Murphy, Gregory L. 2002. The Big Book of Concepts, London, England: The MIT
Press.
106 Chris Thornton
Pet, Willem. 1987. Lokono Dian, the Arawak Language of Surniname: A Sketch of its
Grammatical Structure and Lexicon, Cornell University Doctoral Thesis.
Polinsky, Maria. 2012. Headedness, again. UCLA Working Papers in Linguistics,
Theories of Everything 17(40). 348–359.
Reinhart, Tanya Miriam. 1976. The Syntactic Domain of Anaphora, Doctoral disserta-
tion, Cambridge, Massachusets: MIT.
Rips, Lance J. 1995. The Current status of research on concept combination. Mind
and Language 10. 72–104.
St Clair, Michelle C., Padraic Monaghan, & Michael Ramscar. 2009. Relationships
between language structure and language learning: The suffixing preference
and grammatical categorization. Cognitive Science 33(7). 1317–1329.
Thagard, Paul. 1997. Coherent and creative conceptual combination. In Thomas
Ward, Steven M. Smith & Jyotsna Ed Vaid (eds.), Creative Thought: An Investi-
gation of Conceptual Structures and Processes, Washington, DC: American Psycho-
logical Association.
Tomasello, Michael. 2003. Constructing a Language: A Usage-based Theory of Language
Acquisition, Harvard University Press.
Tomasello, Michael. 2008. Origins of Human Communication, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts: The MIT Press.
Wisniewski, Edward J. 1997. When concepts combine. Psychonomic Bulletin and
Review 4. 167–183.
Chris Thornton
University of Sussex
Centre for Research in Cognitive Science
Brighton
BN1 9QJ
UK
c.thornton@sussex.ac.uk
